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T
o understand the power of
currency to decide the fate of
nations — developing nations,
in particular — Manuel Hinds, 
the former finance minister of El 
Salvador, says it helps to know the
fable of Dema Gogo.
Gogo is the president of a fictional,
poor developing nation. Shortly after
he assumes office, he has a conversa-
tion with the devil, who passes along
an idea he got from a recently
deceased macroeconomist: Create
your own currency, make it the legal
tender, and force citizens to relinquish
their dollars in exchange for the new
currency. This appeals to Gogo since it
would allow the government to create
as much money as it wants and still
receive interest from placing the
newly acquired dollars in a
U.S. savings account. It’s
called seigniorage,
says the devil. A per-
fect solution, it
seems, for a new
ruler who wants to
finance all the pub-




gives the currency the
name “gogo.”
But as is always the
case with Faustian 
bargains, there are 
unexpected consequences.
Oversupply of the currency creates
inflation. That’s a nice thing for
exporters who can  sell to overseas
consumers in exchange for more-valu-
able dollars but bad for laborers who
have begun to protest the increased
prices of imports. 
So the devil suggests devaluing the
currency by raising the official
exchange rate of the dollar from one
to two gogos. That protects the 
government’s reserve of dollars from
falling lower due to increased demand
by citizens for the sounder currency.
But it also scares international
investors afraid of another devaluation
and suddenly the country faces higher
interest rates in international capital
markets. 
The vicious spiral continues. More
political pressure from labor unions
spurs the president to order the print-
ing of more gogos to pay wages. Then
his advisors tell him that he has lost 
all credibility with foreign creditors
and many voters. Soon, the president
finds himself running from an angry
mob of citizens and during the pursuit
falls off a cliff to his death. 
This fable provides insight to the
very real havoc created by political
control over monetary policy in the
developing world, particularly in Latin
America. As a response to those eco-
nomically dangerous impulses, some
economists have suggested that a way
for these economies to break out of
the trap is to hitch their currency to
the U.S. dollar — an action known as
“dollarization.” Yet there are a variety
of ways of achieving this, and the 
distinctions between them could 
have important consequences for 
economic growth.     
The How and Why 
of Dollarization
The term “dollarization” describes a
shift away from a country’s domestic
currencies toward a foreign currency
— typically the U.S. dollar, but not
always — as a store of value, unit of
account, and medium of exchange.
Official dollarization occurs when a
country explicitly makes a foreign cur-
rency the preferred legal tender. 
There are a few countries that have
taken this direct route. The two
biggest economies in this category are







be achieved by 
officially adopting 
a stable foreign 
currency.
Argentina instituted a “currency
board” system in 1991, but 
never adopted a policy of full 
dollarization. Argentine pesos 
like those pictured are still 
in circulation today.has been dollarized since 2001, 
the latter since 2000. Panama 
dollarized in 1904. There are four
other smaller countries that have
fully dollarized: the Marshall
Islands, Micronesia, Palau, and the
British Virgin Islands. Puerto
Rico, the Northern Mariana
Islands, American Samoa, Guam,
and the U.S. Virgin Islands are dol-
larized, too, as a result of being
U.S. territories.
But the shift toward a foreign
currency can occur in countries in
which it is not considered legal tender. In fact, this form of
“unofficial” dollarization in which citizens prefer other cur-
rencies in domestic transactions or as a means to safeguard
the value of their bank savings is more common than the
official form. 
While data on the scope of unofficial dollarization world-
wide are hard to come by, the most recent figures from
economist Edgar Feige of the University of Wisconsin-
Madison are illustrative. The countries with the highest
degree of unofficial dollarization — the amount of foreign
currency in circulation in each country as fraction of the
effective money supply — were Bolivia, Nicaragua, Uruguay,
Croatia, and Russia (see table on page 4).
The holders of foreign currency in these economies are
investing in a hedge against the (often very high) inflation of
their domestic currency. So the main benefit of official dol-
larization — especially when coupled with an elimination of
the central bank functions of the government — would
come from the monetary stability that follows from the
divorce of politics and monetary policy. The transaction
costs from shifting to such an arrangement could also be low
in the countries listed here since so many citizens already use
the sounder currency. 
There are other ways of dollarizing an economy. Instead
of eliminating the central bank function, a government can
replace it with a “currency board.”  This board would be
responsible only for maintaining a specific exchange rate
between the domestic currency and the foreign currency of
choice. Another solution would be to keep the country’s
central bank in its old form and task it with the exchange
rate stability role. These forms of “soft” dollarization, how-
ever, could tempt policymakers to use the monetary tools
that are still available to them and weaken the currency
again. (As we’ll see later, that’s the problem that afflicted
Argentina.)  
The textbook version of any of these forms of dollariza-
tion would lead to a more hospitable environment for
economic growth. In a predollarized scenario, the risk 
premiums — and, therefore, interest rates — charged by
overseas lenders would be high.  In a dollarized scenario,
lower real interest rates for those borrowing from interna-
tional capital markets follow when the risk premiums fall.
Dollarization also reverses the
isolation that results from having
an unstable currency: The newly
dollarized economy will soon find
itself more integrated with inter-
national capital markets. And the
ability of businesses to make long-
term plans becomes more viable
with the stability of the newfound
currency.
There are trade benefits, too,
which are especially important to
developing countries for which
exports compose a large share of
the economy. Dollarization reduces the transaction cost of
exchanging one currency for another. This may not seem like
a big problem, but it certainly can have real effects. Take
trade between Canada and the United States, for instance.
Various studies have concluded that Canadian provinces
tend to trade more with each other than with states in the
United States to which they are closer geographically. Even
with lower trade barriers between the two countries since
NAFTA, it appears that the transaction cost of trading out
currencies has been a contributor to lower trade volume
than one would otherwise expect.
But there is another side of this coin, so to speak. From
the perspective of policymakers, there are indeed downsides
to getting rid of the government’s control over monetary
policy. It eliminates the ability of a central bank to serve as a
lender of last resort and pursue other actions that can pro-
vide stability to the macroeconomy in the face of aggregate
supply or demand shocks. The government would also lose
the revenue generated by seigniorage.
Others have argued that the incentives of the anchor
country could be altered by widespread dollarization of
developing economies. Because the anchor country presum-
ably already has a central bank with the ability to adjust to
economic shocks, the policymakers there might have to con-
sider how their actions will affect the smaller countries that
rely on their monetary stability This won’t be a problem if
the anchor country is likely to experience the same sorts of
simultaneous shocks as the dollarized country. But if the dol-
larized countries are subject to idiosyncratic shocks that are
foreign to the anchor country, there may be international
pressure on the latter to take a policy stance that benefits
the former.    
Dollarization could also deal a blow to “national pride” in
a country that adopts it.  Few politicians are likely to want to
admit that their country’s currency is troubled. Indeed, such
a concern among policymakers in the developing world is
often pointed to by economists like Nobel laureate Robert
Mundell as a reason for why more countries don’t dollarize.
Perhaps most fundamentally, dollarization will achieve its
desired goal only if the anchor country pursues wise mone-
tary policies that result in price stability. For instance, that
has generally been the case in the United States for more
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The main benefit of official
dollarization would come
from the monetary stability
that follows from the divorce
of politics and 
monetary policy.
 than two decades, but there have also
been missteps along the way, such as in
the 1970s, when inflation reached double
digits. Under such circumstances, it’s
unclear that dollarization is preferable to
maintaining an independent currency
and central bank.
Still, from the perspective of most of
the citizens who hold the currency, only
the last of these concerns is likely to be
seen as an actual downside. And there
have been  solutions proposed to over-
come some of these shortcomings
perceived by policymakers. Take the loss
of seigniorage, for example. The anchor
countries could easily share the seignior-
age revenue with the countries that adopt
its currency. Such a revenue-sharing
arrangement existed between the British
government and some of its colonies
before the 1950s. There also exists a
seigniorage-sharing agreement between
the European Central Bank and the
countries that have adopted the euro.
Still, the opposition among policy-
makers in developing countries to
dollarization is probably the most robust
barrier to such policy changes. Exploring
the successful experiments with dollar-
ization in Latin America can help us
understand the circumstances under
which a developing country might adopt
such a policy.  
Successful Dollarization 
in the Real World  
To see how a small country can function
as a dollarized economy, you don’t have to
look any farther south than Panama, which adopted the U.S.
dollar as the official domestic note in 1904. (Panama does
circulate a domestic coin — the “balboa” — but it is fully
convertible at a rate of one coin for one U.S. dollar.) 
The dollarization of Panama did not occur in a political
vacuum. The U.S. government had a specific interest in
building a canal there as the 20th century dawned and was
encouraging the Panamanian government to declare inde-
pendence from Colombia. When it did so in 1904 and new
independent governmental institutions were established, no
central bank was created and the U.S. dollar became the de
facto official currency.    
The absence of a central bank, however, does not mean
there are no options for the private banking system looking
for a lender of last resort in an economic tumult.
Panamanian banks have established lines of credit with for-
eign banks that have branches in Panama and can draw on
those in a liquidity crunch. In fact, Panama is very well-inte-
grated with international financial mar-
kets, particularly after banking laws were
liberalized in 1970.
Juan Luis Moreno-Villalaz explained it
this way in a 1999 article, authored when
he was an advisor to the Ministry of
Economy and Finance in Panama:
“Panama’s monetary system operates as if
it were a competitive macroeconomy,
since monetary equilibrium is the result
of private-sector decisions without gov-
ernment intervention or distortions.”    
Not all dollarization experiments have
begun as peacefully as Panama’s. An
example of a more recently dollarized
economy is Ecuador, which adopted 
the U.S. dollar as the official currency 
in 2000. 
Ecuador’s economic growth was stag-
nating in the 1990s because of a heavy
government presence in the economy.
Policymakers attempted and failed to
open the country to international trade
and capital markets. Meanwhile, political
unrest began to build as the large concen-
tration of business involved in oil
exporting took a hit when oil prices fell,
taking sections of the economy down
with it. A collapse of the banking system
followed in the late 1990s around the time
that the atmospheric phenomenon 
El Niño had a devastating impact on 
production and infrastructure. Runaway
inflation, the result of an overly permis-
sive and politicized central bank prior to
the crisis, was also a factor.
So, dollarization was adopted as part
of the solution, along with the privatiza-
tion of some state-owned enterprises, and liberalization in
labor markets. But it was done in the midst of a political cri-
sis that accompanied the economic downturn. Ecuador had
gone through four presidents between 1996 and 1998. When
the sitting president, Jamil Mahuad, announced the dollar-
ization policy in January 2000, he was deposed days later.
His successor, Vice President Gustavo Noboa, stuck to the
policy and by 2003, his last year in office, the inflation rate
was 7.9 percent — down from close to 100 percent in 2000
— making it the first year since 1972 to see a single-digit
inflation rate.
The Perils of Soft Dollarization 
The Ecuador example shows how dollarization can follow
massive economic dislocation and political unrest. Yet it also
hints at how the form that dollarization takes can affect the
outcome. The Ecuadorian government opted for a soft form
of dollarization — it retained the central bank and allowed 
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 it to function as a lender of last resort. Today, some 
observers suggest that the future of dollarization remains
uncertain in the face of recent stresses to that country’s
banking system.
A country that most vividly illustrates the perils of soft
dollarization is Argentina.  President Carlos Menem came to
office in 1989 during a period of economic stagnation. The
next year, the inflation rate topped 20,000 percent.
Dollarization of the economy began in 1991 and was 
relatively painless since most citizens preferred dollars any-
way, and had large holdings of them. (Dollar notes were
estimated to exceed domestic currency notes and bank
deposits combined.) 
The form that dollarization took here was soft too. The
mechanism used was widely called a “currency board.” It was
tasked with overseeing the convertibility of the currency
and offered anyone who wanted to trade in their pesos for
dollars a 1-to-1 exchange rate. It was a credible commitment
because the board was required to hold dollars in reserve as
means to make good on the exchange and was presumably
bound by the expectation that they would not embark on a
discretionary monetary policy.
This arrangement was in some ways a concession to the
sovereignty concern. At the time, pesos were still in circula-
tion and considered legal tender, but the convertibility of
them to dollars made the U.S. currency the de facto medium
of exchange. Yet it was indeed successful in reducing infla-
tion to single digits by 1993. 
But the currency board deviated from the textbook 
definition. There were some loopholes in the reserve
requirements. The Argentina currency board was able to
hold a certain percentage of government-issued bonds
instead of foreign currency. And the government was quite
eager to run up debt in the years after the currency board
was created.
International investment in the region slowed after inter-
national shocks, like the East Asian and Russian currency
crises, and local ones, like the devaluation of the Brazilian
currency. A recession resulted, but that alone wasn’t 
enough to threaten the currency board structure. Instead,
Argentina’s government had trouble paying interest on the
international and internal debt it had racked up over the pre-
ceding decades. In addition, skepticism of the government’s
commitment to convertibility spooked the markets and
began a “silent run” on bank deposits. 
By this time, the government was led by officials who
were known to be less fond of the currency board structure.
By the middle of 2001, the government was well on its way
to devaluing the peso by violating the convertibility rule.
They also announced a separate set of exchange rates for 
various export transactions. Thus, the currency board
ceased to be a rules-based institution that bound the hands
of policymakers.
Advocates of hard dollarization argue that Argentina
would be in better shape if the discretionary power of the
currency board was taken away completely. They arguably
have a point: When the Argentine peso faced inflationary
pressure from speculators in 1995, the government was able
to reduce that pressure by threatening to shift to
hard dollarization and to get rid of the peso
altogether. By threatening a less discre-
tionary policy, they were able to  protect
their currency. 
Over time the allure of monetary
sovereignty and political pressure pre-
vailed. Economist Kurt Schuler,
currently with the U.S. Treasury
Department, has tallied up the costs to
these sorts of political preferences and dis-
covered that they are steep. Between 1971 and
2000, developing countries without central banks had
about as much inflation as developed countries with central
banks. Presumably the latter learned very important lessons
from the period of high inflation in the 1970s. But develop-
ing countries with central banks have far less success:
Average annual inflation was about 10 times higher in those
countries.
Sometimes truth and fiction look disturbingly similar.
The story of Dema Gogo provides us with insight on mone-
tary experiments in the developing world. Unfortunately, for
many of those countries the fable continues to be closer to
reality than myth.    RF
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